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The Inter-American Development Bank has actively promoted infrastructure reform in Latin 
America. The Bank has also financed private projects aimed at fostering the implementation of 
reforms in the power, gas, water, and transport sectors. Now, the Bank is engaged in a program 
to develop transnational infrastructure projects. 
Two regional initiatives were recently proposed to promote transnational infrastructure: the Ini-
tiative for the Regional Integration of South America (IIRSA in its Spanish  acronym) and the 
Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) for Central America and Mexico. These initiatives face significant
challenges, most of which have not been properly appreciated. This is because transnational pro-
jects have costs and benefits in several countries, with asymmetric distribution of those costs and 
benefits. These features of transnational projects raises new issues that do not appear in projects 
in which benefits are costs are mainly affecting a single country. One relevant issue is that under 
the condition of asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits, individual decisions made by one 
country do not result in optimal levels of investments in transnational projects. Lower than opti-
mal transnational investment results from poor identification of the benefits of transnational pro-
jects, country reluctance to pay for infrastructure assets located abroad and lack of socially a c-
ceptable mechanisms to distribute costs and benefits among countries. Therefore, it may takes a 
great deal of time for two countries to enter into a dialogue about a project with cost and/or bene-
fits in both nations if they lack rules for cooperation and or incentives to communicate with each 
other about the project cost/benefits. 
This article is part of the Inter-American Development Bank efforts to develop a conceptual 
framework for analysing transnational projects issues and developing solutions for dealing with 
them. The main message is to stress that the rules to take decisions strongly affect the perform-
ance of the partnership and that, consequently, attention should be given to their d esign at the 
initial stage. Moreover, partners must not only agree on how to take ordinary decisions, but also 
on how to take special ones, like that of changing the rules along the way, or that o f modifying 
the membership of the group. Specifically, the paper discusses following points. First, the choice 
of partners is a key variable, which affects the choice of voting rules and in turn is also influ-
enced by the conditions for new entries. Second, the choice of voting rules can crucially affect
the degree of confidence and the level of cooperation.
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Introduction
Partners in transnational infrastructure projects
are engaged in long-term and complex rela-
tionships with numerous occasions for dis-
agreement and conflict. Under the basic as-
sumption that they expect sufficient benefits
from working together, even if this means
accepting some partial losses and occasional 
compromises, it becomes important to agree 
upon arbitration rules that would apply in case 
of conflict, rather than waiting for conflict to 
arise. The nature of the partnerships means 
that detailed contracts cannot be written b e-
cause there is too much uncertainty and variety 
in the type of questions that need to be dis-
cussed. If the partnership is open-ended, the 
range of issues that must be decided can i n-
clude additional projects, new entrants and
other topics that extend beyond the scope of 
the original partners. Moreover, national sov-
ereignty adds to the difficulty of letting a
judge arbitrate on the basis of any detailed 
contract, even if one could be written.
The set of rules for making decisions in trans-
national projects conform to the project gov-
ernance structure. Two essential features of
transnational infrastructure projects are the
need for a continued relationship among part-
ners (as opposed to once-and-for-all deals), 
and the variability of issues involved in the 
relationship. Because of these features, gov-
ernance issues in transnational infrastructure
projects require a dynamic analysis in a differ-
ent framework than that of traditional social 
choice theory. Intuitions and prejudices re-
garding what is a good voting system for mak-
ing an occasional decision will fail dramati-
cally when it’s the dynamic consequences of 
the decision are taken into consideration. 
Some rules that may appear to be good when 
making a single decision may be inappropriate
when used for making decisions over time. 
This article discusses the implications of deci-
sion rules in the governance structures of
transnational infrastructure projects. It stresses 
that decision rules strongly affect the perform-
ance of the partnership and that, consequently, 
attention should be given to their design at the 
initial stage. The article also stresses the fact 
that partners must not only agree on how to 
make ordinary decisions, but also special ones 
such as, for example, changing the rules along 
the way or making changes to the membership 
of the group. This paper makes the following 
specific points. First, the choice of partners is 
a key variable, which affects the choice of
decision rules and, in turn, is influenced by the 
conditions for new entrants. Second, the
choice of decision rules can crucially affect the 
degree of confidence and the level of coopera-
tion among partners, as well as the speed at 
which the partnership adopts new decisions. 
Third, agreements on how to eventually
change the initial set of rules and partners 
should be part of the design of a well-
established decision system.
Section 2 discusses the choice of partners in 
transnational projects. Section 3 establishes a 
model for analyzing decision rules and pre-
sents some basic results. Section 4 puts for-
ward criteria for choosing among different
decision rules. Section 5 examines the per-
formance of partnerships under different deci-
sion rules. Section 6 presents recommenda-
tions and conclusions.2
The Choice of Partners
Partnerships in transnational projects are not 
forced upon participants, but they result from 
specific agreements to cooperate. In some
cases, the choice of partners may be dictated 
by physical needs, like the exploitation of a 
shared river basin, for example. But, in most 
cases, physical constraints, even if always
important, are not necessarily binding, and
other considerations should enter the picture. 
These involve the complementarities among 
the parties, the availability of resources, the 
affinities in culture and management style, and 
the mutual trust, among others.
As a first approximation, we assume that each 
of the partners has made a ranking of the po-
tential partnerships into which it would enter. 
This ranking may be based on considerations
like those mentioned above, and summarizes 
the estimated costs and benefits of being part 
of each of the possible partnerships. For i n-
stance, a country 1 with excess capacity in 
electricity may be willing to interconnect its 
power network with country 2, which has a 
deficit, but not with country 3, which also has 
excess capacity and would be a competitor in 
selling electricity to country 2. However,
country 2 may be willing to connect its system 
with both 1 and 3, in order to increase its sup-
ply of electricity.
WHEN WOULD A PARTNERSHIP BE 
ACTUALLY CREATED?
Starting a partnership has financial and politi-
cal costs for participants. Hence, it is impor-
tant that potential partners believe that their 
association has a fair chance of holding t o-
gether. This will partly depend on the alterna-
tive arrangements that each partner might e n-
ter into by joining other groups of countries to 
develop similar or competing projects. We
model the trade-offs between these different 
alliances by assuming that each country has a
preference ranking over the possible partner-
ships that can be formed. Given these prefer-
ences, one may discuss how likely it is that a 
partnership will hold together, taking into
account each of the participant's alternative
options. Our assumption is that a partnership 
will only be created if potential partners feel 
that it will not be easily broken. There are
several possible ways to model the stability of 
partnerships; two of them will be discussed in 
this paper. Whatever the exact definition, we 
are concerned about the existence of stable
partnerships, and also about the possible mul-
tiplicity of such arrangements. 
Existence is relevant because lack of stability
of a potential partnership is likely to result in 
the failure of the transnational project. Yet, 
there may be cases where, if the sources of 
instability are detected early, potential partners 
can change their initial positions and reach a 
stable compromise. Multiplicity is also an
issue: when several stable partnership are
available, the issue becomes to decide which 
one will be implemented in the end. The mul-
tiplicity of stable partnerships does not neces-
sarily mean that any of the stable arrangements 
is equally desirable or equally likely. Stability 
is a property that stresses the ability of some
arrangement to persist once they are reached. 
But reaching a cooperative agreement can
happen in many ways, especially if some sta-
ble arrangements are better than others. Hence, 
the theoretical possibility of multiple stable
partnerships is, in practice, an invitation to 
matchmaking: when there is room for several 
agreements, it is important to understand what 
additional factors can be put into play in order 
to arrive at the most favorable one. 
Having now stressed that existence and multi-
plicity are theoretical questions with interest-
ing practical consequences, let us be more
precise about the type of partnership formation 
game that we have in mind, and the notions of 
stability that apply. By assuming that all that 
matters when determining an alliance i s the
partners that we join, we are restricting atten-3
tion to purely hedonic games. In general cases, 
it may not only matter who my partners are, 
but also how other countries are grouped to-
gether into alternative (and possibly compet-
ing) partnerships. But hedonic games leave
these other aspects aside to concentrate on
those cases where what really matters most 
(actually, we assume that all that matters) is 
who are the partners: these are the so-called
hedonic coalition formation games. Each po-
tential partner has a preference ranking over 
the coalitions it can belong to. If i belongs to 
both A and B, A>(i) B  indicates that i prefers 
the formation of coalition A to coalition  B.
Coalition structures are partitions of the poten-
tial partners into mutually disjoint coalitions. 
We now propose two possible definitions of 
stability. A coalition structure is said to be
core stable if no set T of potential partners can 
become better off by leaving their initial coali-
tions in order to form T. When a coalition 
partition is not core stable, because some set T
of agents would prefer to form, we say that Y
blocks the coalition structure.  A coalition 
structure is Nash stable if no potential partner 
would prefer to join any of the existing coali-
tions instead of staying in the one where the 
structure places him. Each of these two defini-
tions captures something relevant to the stabil-
ity of a given set of partnerships. Core stability 
concentrates on the need to avoid coordinated,
cooperative moves of different agents to form 
a new partnership. Nash stability takes a non-
cooperative approach and prescribes that no 
agent should find it advantageous to unilater-
ally abandon its present partners to join others. 
Interestingly, these two types of stability are 
independent: one can be guaranteed when the 
other is not. Examples 1 and 2 exhibit situa-
tions where one form of stability is achieved 
and the other is not. Ideally, one would be
interested in forming partnerships in contexts 
where both types of stability hold. Yet, there 
may be cases when none can be achieved!
This is described in example 3.
.
Example 1*
An Undesired Guest. Core Stability Without Nash Stability
There are three countries that are considering integrating their power transmission networks. Coun-
try 1 and country 2 have similar internal regulations and sector structures, while country 3’s sector
structure is a public monopoly producing and distributing electricity. Countries 1 and 2 wish to
integrate their network to increase sector competition and efficiency. However, they refuse to inte-
grate their network with country 3 because they suspect that country 3 will compete unfairly.
Country 3 wishes to integrate its network with countries 1 and 2 in order to increase its potential
market. Formally, these preferences may be represented as follows:
•  Country 1 Preferences: {12} > {1} > {123} > {13} 
•  Country 2 Preferences: {12}>{2}>{123} >{23}
•  Country 3 Preferences: {123} > {23} > {13} > {3}
The core partnership is {12} because no other coalition yields a better outcome for countries 1 and
2. However, it is not Nash stable because country 3 would prefer joining 1 and 2, rather than stay-
ing alone.
*The example is drawn from Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). It has been slightly modified to put
it in the context of transnational projects.4
Example 2**
Company is Good, but Two Are Better than Three. Nash Stability Without Core Stability
Three countries are considering whether to integrate their power transmission networks. The sector
structures of the three countries consist of one integrated public monopoly. The countries wish to 
integrate their power networks in order to reduce the variable cost of producing electricity and to
increase the security of the system. System security increases with the integration of two countries' 
networks, but it decreases when a third country is added. However, system stability is better under
three-country integration than with isolated countries. Therefore, the three countries prefer two-
country integration to three-country integration, but they prefer three-country integration to remain-
ing isolated. However, countries do not have compatible preferences on how to integrate. Country
1 prefers integration with country 2 to integration with country 3, while country 2 prefers integra-
tion with country 3 to integration with country 1, and 3 prefers 1 to 2. Formally, these preferences
may be represented as follows:
Country 1 Preferences {12} > {13} > {123} >{1}
Country 2 Preferences {23} > {21} >{123} > {2}
Country 3 Preferences {31} > {32} >{123} > {3}
In this example, there is no core stable coalition structure, but {123} is the unique Nash stable ar-
rangement
* *The example is drawn from Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). It has been slightly modified to 
put it in the context of transnational projects.
Example 3
Two Is Company, Three Is a Disgusting Crowd. A Case for Instability.
Three countries are considering whether to integrate their power transmission networks. The sector 
structures of the three countries consist of one integrated public monopoly. The three countries 
wish to integrate their power networks in order to reduce the variable costs of pr oducing electricity, 
and also to increase the security of the system. System security increases with the integration of 
two of the countries' networks, but it decreases when a third one is added. Therefore, the three 
countries prefer two-country integration to three-country integration. In fact, isolated networks are 
more secure than three integrated networks. Countries do not have compatible preferences on how 
to integrate. Thus, country 1 prefers integration with country 2 over integration with country 3, 
while country 2 prefers integration with country 3 over integration with country 1.And 3 prefers 1 
rather than 2. Formally, these preferences may be represented as follows
Country 1 Preferences     {12} > {13}> {1} > {123}
Country 2 Preferences     {23} > {21} >{2} >{123} 
Country 3 Preferences     {31 >  {32} > {3}> {123}
In this third example, no coalition structure is either in the core or Nash stable. 
**The example is drawn from Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). It has been slightly modified to 
put it in the context of transnational projects.5
The foregoing discussion suggests that even 
beneficial partnerships may be unstable in the 
presence of alternative and competing possi-
bilities. Whether or not this is a real threat to 
the emergence of partnerships will depend on 
the actual options open to different partners. 
The literature on hedonic games describes a 
number of situations where the preferences of 
players will guarantee the existence (and
sometimes the uniqueness) of stable partner-
ships. Let us briefly discuss two of them. The 
first one is called the weak top-coalition prop-
erty, and it expresses the existence of a fair 
degree of unanimity among potential partners 
regarding what arrangements are most desi r-
able, combined with a dose of realism (See 
Banerjee et al. for more formal definitions and 
results). Consider all potential partners, and 
assume that a group of them, S1, is such that all 
its members consider S1 to be their best choice. 
These people are obviously happy if they are 
together, and want no additional partners. Now 
suppose that there is a second group, S2, whose 
members agree that S2 is the best group they 
can reach, once they admit that no member in 
S1 will join them. Further assume that there is 
another group, S3, which is the best group for 
all its members, as long as they admit that no 
one from S1 or S2 will join them, and that this 
pattern continues for a list S1, S2, S3,….Sk, until 
all potential partners are taken into account. If 
preferences of agents are of this sort, then 
there will always exist core stable allocations.
How likely is it for a set of potential partners 
to meet the weak top-coalition property? The 
answer to this question depends on the nature 
of the transnational project at hand. The essen-
tial feature is that one group should exist such 
that no partner is inclined to include anyone 
else that others consider harmful, and that no 
partner should receive offers from another
group that may be better. As presented, this is 
a condition of unanimity a nd realism (we are 
the best possible group, once we discard the 
unreachable partners). In many cases, potential
partners for transnational projects may reach 
situations of this nature, at least after having 
tried a few alternative possibilities and having 
adapted their preferences to reality.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) also discuss
a parallel property to guarantee the existence 
of individually stable partnerships. They are a 
combination of two requirements called o r-
dered characteristics and consistency. We
leave it for the interested reader to go into the 
details, and just provide an example where
existence would be guaranteed. This is the
case where potential partners only care about 
the size of the partnership they will be a part 
of, and their preferences about size are single 
peaked. This means that each partner can still 
have a range of different preferences: some 
may be for small groups, some for large ones. 
What they have in common is that, whatever 
size they prefer, they will find smaller partner-
ships to be worse the smaller they are, and 
partnerships that are larger than the ideal size 
will be worse, the larger they are. This condi-
tion is enough for individually stable partner-
ships to exist. Again, we may ask, when is this 
likely to hold in the context of transnational 
projects? We believe that the condition will 
not hold in projects where partners’ contribu-
tions are very asymmetrically, since the num-
ber of partners may not be nearly as significant 
as their quality. However, it may hold quite
approximately in other cases where the main 
reason to contribute is to share some common 
costs and benefits. Then, a larger partnership 
may be better than a smaller one, as long as 
this results in a decrease in the individual’s 
share of the cost. A larger partnership may 
also be a stronger one. But, of course, coordi-
nation problems and other difficulties associ-
ated with size may work in the reverse direc-
tion of decreasing some of the benefits, while 
introducing costs of a new type. The peak of 
each country's preference would reflect its 
estimate of the optimal size, in view of such 
considerations.
We have thus seen that stability of both types 
may or may not hold, depending on the cir-
cumstances. In particular, the nature of the
benefits to be gained, and of the  costs to be 
shared is crucial. In many practical situations 
it may be that those sufficient conditions for 
stability do hold for a wide class of transna-
tional projects, especially if the superiority of 
certain arrangements becomes clear for all 6
interested parties, and/or if the possible deals 
exhibit sufficient symmetry among parties. A 
final warning is in order. We have discussed 
stability issues in the context of purely hedonic
games. Other types of games have been stud-
ied in the literature on coalition f ormation,
allowing for partners to simultaneously nego-
tiate on whether to join, and also on possible 
internal compensation schemes. The choice of 
model was made in order to emphasize the
dangers of instability within a simple fram e-
work. There is no doubt t hat a richer frame-
work may give hints in further directions, but 
we hope that the point about stability is suffi-
ciently made. 
WHEN TO ACCEPT A 
NEW PARTNER?
Changes in the number of partners should be 
expected in any partnership. Partnerships must 
have  rules allowing some partners to expel 
others under exceptional circumstances, or
partners to leave the group under certain con-
ditions. Dissolving the partnership is also an 
extreme action that must be contemplated.
Similarly, partnerships must have rules  for
accepting new partners. We concentrate here 
on the question of admission of new members 
to an already existing partnership. The main 
conclusion of the analysis is that the rules for 
expansion must be part of the initial negotia-
tion among the founders o f the partnership 
because they can play an important role in 
deciding whether or not to form it in the first 
place. This role may be positive or negative, 
and depend on the rules adopted for expan-
sion. But it certainly should not be ignored, 
and it has an essentially dynamic character.
Consider a set of partners that have already 
agreed to cooperate and want to set rules for 
possible future expansion. They have to con-
sider the potential set of future entrants,
or candidates, and evaluate the impact of each
entry. On a first analysis, what a new entrant 
brings into the partnership may be similar to 
the contributions of already existing partners. 
Hence, we may assume that each founder can 
appraise whether the entry of a new member is 
or is not desirable, and to what degree. For 
simplicity, let us assume that the desirability 
of each new partner can be judged independ-
ently; in practice, there may be complemen-
tarities. Would this appraisal be sufficient to 
predict, given an admission rule, which new 
partners would be invited to enter? Not neces-
sarily, if we consider the full consequences of 
an admission decision over time.
Indeed, the admission of a new partner has a 
double consequence. Existing partners enjoy 
(or suffer) the consequences of a new member 
in the partnership. However, the new partner 
also has voting power and this may substan-
tially alter the overall evaluation of new e n-
trants at any given point in time. Thus, a can-
didate for entry may be attractive as long as he 
does not get the right to vote, but become un-
attractive if given voting rights because, say, 
he is known to have leanings toward further 
admissions that may be unattractive to the
existing partner considering his admission.
This may lead that existing partner to prefer a 
postponement of membership expansion, at
least until a time when such an expansion
looks less threatening. Notice that this phe-
nomenon only occurs if the decisions taken by 
the founders involve the entry of new mem-
bers who get a voice, and within a multi-
period context where this new voice can have 
further consequences. It would not occur if the 
decisions involved new projects rather than 
new partners, or even if the partners were r e-
cruited toward the end of the joint venture,
with no ability to influence future member-
ship.7
Once we consider this double effect, it b e-
comes clear that the choice of admission rules 
for future partners is a nontrivial matter (see 
Barberà et al., 2001; Barberà and Perea, 2002). 
A more conservative rule that preserves some 
degree of control over future events, may end 
up facilitating a faster growth of the partner-
ship than an apparently more lenient admis-
sion rule. In fact, a similar effect will occur 
when we consider the dynamic effects of other 
decisions, provided that we do not treat them 
as one-shot decisions, but that we pay due
attention to the way in which they unfold over 
time. This is the subject of Section 4. 
In order to emphasize the importance of set-
ting the expansion rules from the beginning, I 
will just mention some of the strategic a ctivi-
ties that partners can engage in and whose
consequences may differ de pending on
the expansion rule adopted. First, notice that 
logrolling phenomena are to be expected when 
the admission of new members requires more 
than one vote: you may support an entrant who 
is important for your partner in exchange for 
your partner's support of the entry of someone 
important to you. Second, you may accept a 
new entrant not because of your expectations 
about new entrants, but to get the support of 
partners on other issues of interest to you,
including further admissions. Third, strategic 
behavior may appear even in cases in which 
only one vote is required for new entry.
1
Again, discovering the theoretical possibility 
of such strategic interactions r emind us that, 
when negotiating the initial arrangements for a 
partnership, we should not forget that expan-
sion rules are an important aspect of the initial 
negotiation.
1 In the Appendix we provide an example of a 
different type of strategic behavior, which arises 
even in the case where one vote is sufficient for 
new entries.
Example 4
Unanimity Rule Versus Majority Rules For Accepting Partners
 Consider five country founders who have agreed to integrate their electricity markets and to de-
velop the required transmission network. They have also agreed on a rule that requires that at least
five of the original partners endorse the entry of a new country into the group. 
How does this rule perform, if we compare it with one that only requires three favorable votes?
Assume that each of the new candidates favors the entry of additional countries, which they will try
to push into the partnership once they are in. Suppose that they have enough supporters within the 
founders to eventually force the admission of these additional countries if the rule is three, but that
they will never be able to get five votes for the new candidates. Then, those fou nders that would be 
ready to vote for the original candidate, but prefer the expansion to stop there, may accept the new-
comer under the rule of five (the one that allows them to block further entry). But they would not
support the newcomer under the rule of three because this would start an undesired second round of
admissions.8
The Preferences of Partners Over Decision Rules: 
A Basic Model
This section describes a simple m odel to ana-
lyze why different agents may have different 
preferences about the rules to govern joint
decisions. The model is taken from Barberà 
and Jackson (2000), and follows a tradition 
started by Rae (1969). In spite of its simplic-
ity, it allows us to understand different aspects 
regarding the choice of a choice rule. In par-
ticular, it allows us to derive (rather than to 
assume) the preferences of partners over quali-
fied majority rules.
THE MODEL
We consider the following model. There are n
partners, who will face a sequence of decisions 
involving, in each case, only two possible
courses of action. One of them we call the
status quo, and the other we call change.
2 Each 
partner i is characterized by a parameter p(i),
between zero and 1, to be interpreted as the 
probability that the partner gives to being in 
favor of change if presented with a particular 
binary choice. Hence, an agent would have
p(i)=1 if he was sure to always favor change. 
In order to avoid trivial cases, we assume that 
0 and 1 are excluded values for p(i). Yet, an 
agent with  p(i)= .9 will be someone very
likely to favor change, and p(j)= .01 will stand 
for someone that only rarely wants change.
3
We also assume that their values are common
knowledge to all partners, and that the specific 
random draws that determine whether an agent 
is for or against change at each decision m o-
ment are independent from one agent to the 
other.
2 Both proposals will imply change in most cases. 
However, in order to avoid cycles, at any point in 
time partners face only two alternatives
3 Possible changes to enrich this simple model will 
be discussed in Section 6, about extensions and 
conclusions.
We assume that all partners derive satisfaction
when the social decision coincides with their 
vote, and not otherwise, and that their utilities 
are additive. Votes will be non-strategic, be-
cause they only involve separable yes/no deci-
sions We treat all issues as equally important, 
and normalize utilities to one, every time that 
the partner gets his way, and zero when he 
doesn’t.
Each qualified majority rule is described by a 
single parameter s, between 1 and n, which 
determines the amount of support that is r e-
quired for the partnership to adopt change.
Hence, s=1 corresponds to the case where the 
favorable vote of a single partner is enough to 
precipitate change, while s=n stands for the 
unanimity rule: only changes that everyone
supports will be adopted. Simple majority is 
the case where s= (n+1)/2, when n is odd, and 
(n/2)+1, when n is even.
A simple calculation enables us to compute the 
preferences of each partner on the different 
values of s, given the pattern of the  p(i)'s
across different partners. For each decision
rule s, agent i gets utility one if change is en-
acted and she agrees with change (situation a), 
or if she is against change and change is not 
adopted (situation b). The probability of situa-
tion a is given by the probability that at least s-
1 of the other partners want change, times the 
probability that i wants change. Likewise, the 
probability of situation b is given by the prob-
ability of, at most, s-1 of the others want
change, times the probability of i not desiring 
it. The expected utility of agent i under rule s
can be calculated as follows. It is the sum of 
these two probabilities times the utility that i
obtains from them (which we assume to be
one), plus the complementary probability
times the utility of society making the decision 
that agent i does not favor (which we assume 
to be zero). Hence, in our case, the expected 9
utility for individual i of society's decision to 
use rule s will be equal to the probability of i 
finding  that her desired decision coincides 
with that of society
4 (which, as we have seen, 
depends on s in a very neat way).
SOME RESULTS
A first result is when all partners have the
same probability of favoring change, that is, 
when p(i)=p(j) for all i and j, then all partners
have the same preferences on decision rules. 
Moreover, they all agree that simple majority 
is their preferred rule. This gives simple m a-
jority a salient status, as the unanimous choice 
in homogeneous societies.
This fact is not hard to argue, but notice that it 
is far from intuitive. If you ask people about 
the preferred rule for a partnership whose
members are averse to change (with p(i)=.1,
say), and for another partnership of change
lovers (with p(j)=.9 for all), the tendency is to 
assume that the more conservative partnership 
will favor a more conservative rule, that is, a 
higher s, than the one that is pro change. Yet, 
this is not true. In both cases partners will 
agree, by unanimity, to choose the simple 
majority rule. This is because what matters to 
each partner is how often he will be on the 
winning side, and in a homogeneous society it 
is always more likely to be in the larger than in 
the smaller group, for any partition. Of course, 
the society where all agents have p(j) =.9 will 
find itself more often in favor of change than 
the one where agents favor change with
p(i)=.1. But in both societies all agents will 
agree that simple majority is the best rule.
Notice that the preferences of any partner for 
different decision rules depends on her atti-
4 We have described it for the case where the prob-
abilities for each individual to be for or against 
change are independently distributed, and where 
the agent's utilities are zero or one. We could com-
plicate the model by assuming that the probabilities 
are not independent, and also by assuming that 
partners care about different issues with different 
intensities. But our qualitative statements would 
not change.
tudes toward change as well as on the attitudes 
of others. One cannot, a priori, determine
whether a partner will favor the use of a high 
or of a low majority by just knowing her will-
ingness to change. One must also know the 
willingness of others to change. What matters 
is not the absolute value of p(i), but its posi-
tion relative to the p's of other partners. 
A second result is that, when agents have dif-
ferent p's, then the preferred rules for different 
agents are ranked in inverse order than their 
p's. That is, if p(i) >p(j), then  s*(i)<s*(j),
where s* stands for the most preferred rule for 
the corresponding agent. In simple words, the 
partners who are more pro change will tend to 
favor rules that make change easier, by d e-
manding a smaller fraction of the population's 
vote to pass change.
The next two results will prove to be important
when discussing the possibility that partners 
might choose their decision rule by means of a 
previous vote. 
The third result
5 is that, for any partner i, and 
whatever the distribution of p's among part-
ners, the preferences of all agents over voting 
rules will be single peaked. That is: each agent 
will have a best voting rule s*(i) (exception-
ally, in our model there may be two contigu-
ous ones), and if rule s>s'>s*(i), or
s<s´<s*(i), then iprefer s´ to s.
The fourth result says that the preferences of 
all agents satisfy a condition of intermediate-
ness. If two agents agree on how to rank a pair 
of rules, then all the other agents whose posi-
tion in terms of p's is intermediate between the 
two also rank s and s´ in the same way. Con-
sider that agent i and agent j both prefer voting 
rule s to voting rule s´, and that p(i)<p(j). Then 
all other agents k such that p(i)<p(k)<p(j) will 
also prefer rule s to s´. 
5 Single peakedness is a very well known concept,
first introduced by Duncan Black (1948) in the 
theory of voting more than fifty years ago. The 
notion of intermediate preferences is due to 
Grandmont (1978).10
Taken together, the two results above prove 
that the preferences of agents over different 
voting rules are well behaved. In particular, 
single peakedness and intermediateness, each 
by itself, are sufficient to guarantee that there 
exists a rule that would defeat all others in 
pairwise majority contests. Hence, one could 
organize the initial choice of rules as a majori-
tarian election with no fear that cycles would 
result. In the next section we shall discuss 
other considerations that may lead a partner-
ship to choose one rule over the others.11
The Choice of Rules and How to Change Rules
Knowing the preferences of partners regarding
voting rules may allow us to predict which one 
will be chosen to govern their relationships, or 
to discuss from a normative point of view 
which rule should be chosen. There is not one 
single and definite answer to these questions. 
Let us discuss several competing approaches.
VOTING RULES FOR EFFICIENCY
A criterion for choosing a voting rule may be 
to select the one that guarantees the maximum 
total utility to partners. In the simple model we 
described in the previous section, the rule of 
simple majority has some permanent features 
that distinguish it from the other majority 
rules: it is the one that guarantees the maxi-
mum aggregate utility. To see this, remember 
that the utility of each agent equals the prob-
ability of finding herself on the winning side; 
that is, of seeing change when she favors
change and stopping change when she does 
not want it to occur. Since simple majority 
maximizes the number of partners who can 
feel that they got their way after each voting 
decision, it is the most efficient rule in the
utilitarian sense. 
A similar reasoning allows us to understand 
that efficiency may require other types of vot-
ing rules under alternative circumstances. If 
different partners care for different issues with 
different intensities, then we will have to look 
for a different balance. We will have to com-
pare the probability of being on the right side 
with the importance of the issues for which 
one may find oneself on the wrong side. This 
can lead to the choice of different rules than 
that of simple majority. Yet, in a world where 
one does not know a priori what the issues will 
be, how opinions will be split between part-
ners, and whether disagreements will entail 
minor or major issues, it may be a good idea to 
stick to our model because it treats all cases 
symmetrically. Under these conditions, simple 
majority emerges as the favorite rule on effi-
ciency grounds (for details, see Badger (1972), 
Barberà and Jackson, 2000).
Different and more complicated questions
arise if the size of the countries or the intensity
of their interest in the project does matter as 
far as the partnership is concerned. In transna-
tional partnerships some of the members may 
represent much larger populations than others, 
or may derive much higher benefits from c o-
operation. These are factors to be taken into 
account, and which may lead som e of the part-
ners to demand a larger number of votes than 
those assigned to others. In section 6 we 
briefly discuss some of the grounds on which 
these distinctions may be justified, the extent 
of the admissible differences and the implica-
tions of assigning a different number of votes 
to different partners.
DECISION RULES FOR FAIRNESS
Let us now turn our attention to a different 
normative criterion. The members of the part-
nership may agree to choose that rule which 
maximizes the expected gain of the least  for-
tunate partner. This position is a ssociated with 
a notion of fairness, or egalitarianism, and is 
called the  maximin criterion. Typically, the 
use of this criterion in order to choose a rule 
will not lead to recommend a simple majority. 
We have already mentioned that the partners'
preferred rules (the peaks of their preferences) 
will be ordered in such a way that the most 
conservative agents will favor the higher size 
majorities (all this in relative terms). Start by 
considering the peak of the agent with a higher 
p. Say that it is at majority size s. This will be 
the lowest among the majority sizes where 
some agents would not wish to see the major-
ity size increased, while others will. Consider 
now the next higher majority rule, s+1. The 
partners whose peak was at s would loose
utility if s+1 was chosen, relative to s, while 
other agents would gain utility. Going to s+212
will again decrease the utility of agents with 
peak at s, and also that of the (possible) part-
ners with peak at s+1, while still i ncreasing
the utility of those with peaks above s+1. By 
continuing this process until we get at the peak 
of the agent with a lower p, we are thus gener-
ating a sequence of utilities for the different 
agents, with the following characteristics. The 
worse treated agent at the beginning of the
sequence is the agent with the lowest p, and 
her utility keeps increasing along the se-
quence. The agent who is treated best at the 
first step of the sequence is the one with the 
highest p, and her utility keeps decreasing
along  the sequence. Moreover, one of these
two extreme agents is the worst treated all 
along the sequence. Hence, the maxmin crite-
rion recommends choosing the rule where the 
utilities of these two agents are more equal-
ized. In general, the maxmin criterion will
choose a majority size different than simple 
majority. The choice of these rules is a lmost
unique, and it can always be made compatible 
with ordinal Pareto efficiency, though it typi-
cally will not lead to surplus maximization 
(see Coelho, 2002).
A TWO STEP PROCESS
The choice of rules by means of a normative
criterion can be viewed as the outcome of a 
two-step process. At a first stage, agents would 
try to agree on general principles, like max i-
mizing the sum of utilities or ensuring fair-
ness. The choice of principles may be reached 
by unanimity among partners or may reflect 
the decision of promoters. Efficiency would be 
the most likely criterion to guide partnerships 
for developing transnational infrastructure
projects. However, since transnational infra-
structure projects are promoted by multilateral 
agencies; implications on income distribution 
are also usually taken into account. Therefore,
some sort of fairness criterion should be i n-
cluded in the partnership. Having reached an 
agreement on general principles, partners can 
then establish, in a second step, the rule that 
satisfies those principles (taking their particu-
lar circumstances into account). If they agreed 
on efficiency only, then they should agree to 
use simple majority. If they agreed on egali-
tarianism, then they should select the rule that 
maximizes the utility of the partner that reaps 
the least benefit from this choice of rule.
Thus, in addition to its normative meaning, the 
choice of rules (according to the utilitarian or 
to the egalitarian criterion) can be viewed as 
predictions of possible consensus positions, if 
the partners are bound to choose the voting 
rule by unanimity. Even if they were not oper-
ating under a veil of ignorance, but aware of 
their differences, they may put them aside and
agree upon a general principle like the ones 
mentioned above.
CHOOSE HOW TO CHOOSE
DECISION RULES THROUGH A 
VOTING SYSTEM.
An alternative view to that of choosing princi-
ples is to take into account that decision rules 
themselves are also chosen by vote. Consider, 
then, that partners will vote on how to vote. In 
order to avoid circularities
, we set the problem 
in the following terms. Society already has a 
rule in place, which is used for everyday deci-
sions. Now we can ask whether it is a good 
idea to use the same rule or a different rule to 
decide whether to shift from the current rule to 
any other one. 
If we decide to use the same rule that is used 
to adopt ordinary decisions, problems may 
arise when the time comes to debate whether 
we should change rules. To see that, say that a 
majority size s is self stable if less than s part-
ners want to change to another rule s´, for any 
s´ different from s. In that case, no proposal to 
change the rule away from s would be passed, 
according to the s rule. Unfortunately, we can-
not be sure that there will always be a self-
stable rule. This will depend on the distribu-
tion of the partners' willingness to change. We 
have already mentioned that when all partners 
have the same p's, then they all agree that si m-
ple majority is the best rule. However, there 
are situations where no self-stable voting rule 
exists. Example 5 shows a case in which no 
stable rule may be found.13
In view of that difficulty, it makes sense to 
endow partnerships with two rules, rather than 
one. One of the rules would be used for every-
day decisions, and the other for changing the 
rule of everyday decision. The latter should be 
chosen in a way that guarantees overall stabil-
ity.
Let introduce the concept of a constitution, as 
defined by two decision rules, (s, S). These 
rules may be interpreted as follows: s is the 
rule to be used for everyday decisions, while S 
is the rule to be used to change s. Say that a 
constitution (s, S) is self stable if no rule s´ can 
beat s by S or more votes. Contrary to self-
stable voting rules, self-stable constitutions
always exist, irrespective of the partners' will-
ingness to change. Which ones will satisfy this 
property will depend on the distribution of p's, 
in general terms. But one combination is a l-
ways self-stable, for any distribution. It is the 
constitution with s is simple majority rule and 
S is unanimity rule. This is because our model 
implies that, for all societies, if some voters 
prefer a rule lower than simple majority, then 
some others will prefer a rule higher than sim-
ple majority. Hence, there will never be a
unanimous direction of departure away from 
simple majority. Also self stable for each
given distribution is the constitution where s is 
the median of the distribution of the partner's
preferred rules, and S is larger than simple 
majority. This is because (by the definition of 
the median) one cannot get more than half of 
the population to agree on lowering the rule 
below the median, or to agree on increasing it 
above the median (see Barberà and Jackson,
2000).
Partnerships should take these remarks into 
account when selecting their own rules, and 
decide whether they prefer to establish a guar-
antee of stability by distinguishing between 
standard voting rules for everyday business 
and a constitutional rule to change rules. 
Example 5
No Stable Decision Rule
The partnership consists of five countries that are engaged in developing a rail network. They have
an initial project to develop the transnational infrastructure over 10 years. Nevertheless, they wish
to establish a rule for accepting or rejecting modifications to the initial projects. Countries 1, 2, and
3 have similar preferences. After analyzing the expected modifications to be considered, the three
countries believe that the probability of accepting a change will be 50 percent. These subjective 
probabilities may be seen as derived from the expected benefit that the country will receive with
the corresponding modification. The other two countries will be more reluctant to approve modifi-
cations and they have a lower probability of accepting a modification. Formally, partners have the
following probability of voting a change:
•  p(1)=p(2)=p(3)= 1/2, p(4)=3/8 and p(5)=3/16
Using the simple model of the previous section, we can conclude that countries 1, 2, and 3 would
prefer to establish a rule that allows for a modification when two countries favor it, country 4 pr e-
fers a rule requiring 3 votes for accepting changes, while country 5 demands 4 votes before accept-
ing them. Formally, the preferred rules for the countries are:
•  s*(1)=s*(2)=s*(3)= 2, s*(4)=3 and s*(5)=4.
To verify that there are no self-stable voting procedures, notice first that all voters want to raise the
quota from 1 and lower it from 5. Hence, neither 1 nor 5 are self-stable. Voters 1, 2 and 3 would
vote to lower if from 3 to 2 (and succeed, since they have three votes). Voters 1, 2, 3 and 4 would
vote to lower it from 4 to 3, and voters 3 and 4 would vote to raise it from 2 to 3. Thus, no rule is
self-stable.14
The Performance of Partnerships Under 
Different Decision Rules
This section analyzes the quality of the coop-
eration that will arise among the partners of a 
transnational infrastructure project. We shall 
not discuss the characteristics of the project 
and how its relevance for each partner may be 
evaluated. Rather, we will take the view that, 
whatever the project is, it is complex enough 
that its implementation will take time, and that 
many partial issues will arise during the execu-
tion stage. Any complex project (building
infrastructure, operating a common facility,
gradually integrating parts of different eco-
nomic systems, etc.) entails many changes in 
the initial blueprint, however detailed this
blueprint was. Its implementation often re-
quires that each partner perform a part of the 
task, and this will frequently generate discrep-
ancies regarding the causes of delays or other 
imperfections in the degree of compliance
with these different duties. These and other
issues will arise, and conflicts of interest will 
have to be solved through negotiation. Som e-
times, the partners will have to vote on issues. 
In other cases, partners will try to settle their 
differences without needing to resort to a vote. 
But the voting rule looms in the background,
even when it is not used, as a threat or as a 
guarantee. This is why we want to compare the 
expected performance of similar partnerships, 
facing a sequence of potential disagreements 
on how to proceed, depending on the rules that 
they have adopted. And we also want to know 
whether it makes sense for partnerships that 
expect to face quite different sequences of
choices to choose different rules accor dingly.
We shall concentrate on two aspects of the
performance of partnerships, according to the 
decision rules that they have favored. The first 
aspect will be the ability to implement change. 
Specifically, we shall discuss whether it is true 
that rules close to unanimity make it harder 
than simple majority for the partnership to
make progress. The second a spect will be the 
tendency of agents to form coalitions and to 
engage in vote- trading, depending on the rules 
to be used.
6
The first issue we want to discuss is the impact 
of different decision rules on the ease with 
which new proposals can be enacted. Some
partnerships opt for the unanimity rule, and 
this means that changes upon the status quo at 
any point require the complete agreement of 
all partners. A leading example is the Euro-
pean Union, which requires unanimity of all 
the member states in order to adopt changes. 
There is no doubt that a unanimous rule, by 
giving veto power to all partners, makes it 
hard to introduce changes. New proposals for 
improvement must be agreed upon by every-
one, decisions arbitrating between conflicting 
views easily fall i nto stalemate, and so on.
This explains a growing consensus among
many EU leaders that a well functioning part-
nership may want to use the rule of simple 
majority or, at any rate, some qualified major-
ity far from unanimity, in order to expedite 
common business.
Without going as far as defending the use of 
the unanimity rule, it will be worth pointing at 
several reasons why the d ynamic aspect of a 
partnership may affect our initial intuitions
regarding the connection between the ease
with wich change can be made and the type of 
voting rule used. Clearly, if we consider a one-
shot relationship between agents who must
make one single common decision, changes 
are easier to adopt under rules that require a 
6 A third aspect, having to do with the ability of 
rules to take into account the views of the citizens
of each country, is the issue of legitimacy. Rules 
should be such that all citizens feel sufficiently
represented. This has to do with the possibility that 
different countries get different voting weights, 
which is briefly mentioned in Section 6.15
smaller number of approvals for change. N o-
tice, however, that partnerships have a long 
life ahead, if they form, and that many differ-
ent issues will arise for a vote. Thus, the
choice of rule may have additional effects, in 
at least two directions.
First, the choice of rule may affect the likeli-
hood of acceptance to form the partnership.
Veto power is a guarantee that others will not 
easily overrule the proposals of one partner, 
and some potential participants may, in fact, 
shy away unless given a guarantee in the form 
of rules that require high levels of conse nsus
in order to make new decisions. It may be that 
rules involving less veto power for partners 
become i ncreasingly acceptable to the extent 
that past experience induces mutual trust. But 
it is clear that most partners will demand some 
guarantees. This is one reason why low major-
ity requirements may work against actual deci-
sion making.
Second, a small majority may sometimes slow 
down the adoption of new projects, if partners 
foresee that they can fall too easily into a m i-
nority and become unable to redress the deci-
sions made by others. Notice that, in our pre-
vious discussion, we were not too explicit 
about the origin of the proposals to be faced by 
the partnership. In practice, many proposals 
are only advanced if they have a good chance 
of being passed, and their presentation on the 
floor comes only after substantial preparation. 
But even then, many of the proposals that a 
partnership will face are only rough plans, to 
be developed into detail through a number of 
further decisions. Suppose, for example, that a 
new long-term project is presented, and that 
some majority s is required to pass it. It is not 
clear if it will pass more easily if a larger m a-
jority s´ is required. If the course of action to 
be taken in the future will be gradually deter-
mined by future decisions, I may require quite 
a bit of veto power before even accepting to 
start the process. My voting attitude today may 
be much more generous if I know that my 
voting power in the future guarantees that I 
will be able to avoid decisions that I consider
wrong. So, starting a new project by an a l-
ready existing partnership may become more 
likely under a high majority system than a
lower one, contrary to initial intuition. 
We have seen before that simple majority is 
the only rule that maximizes the global utility 
of partners. However, simple majority as well 
as other voting systems, are subject to coali-
tional manipulations through vote trading that 
may lower their degree of collective effi-
ciency. It is important to be aware of these 
possibilities when assessing the performance 
of different vote rules: some rules that appear 
to be more efficient may, in fact, turn out to be 
less so if they end up favoring a larger degree 
of logrolling. The possibilities we refer to are 
illustrated in the concluding remarks of Bar-
berà and Jackson (2000), where vote trading is 
incorporated to the basic model we have been 
discussing.16
Extensions and Conclusions
This section points to some extensions and 
improvements that would enrich our present
analysis of decision rules in transnational pro-
jects or other kind of long-term partnerships. 
First, it would be interesting to include an
explicit analysis of the process for agenda
formation, that is, which type of modifications
will finally be submitted for consi deration. It 
is well known that many international organi-
zations as well as other types of committees, 
prefer to look for large consensus, and only 
use the possibility of a decision by a short 
margin as a threat or as a last resort. The
model presented in this article is sufficient to 
encompass some essential features in constitu-
tional choice: the fact that voting methods
should be useful for any type of unexpected
contingencies, and regardless of the position of 
the different partners about each one. How-
ever, the model does not permit an analysis of 
the cases in which the agenda depends upon 
partner preferences. For instance, the model is 
not appropriate for decision making when
some proposals might not be presented for a 
vote, even if they might win by a narrow mar-
gin; instead, partners may keep iterating their 
agenda proposals in order to achieve higher 
levels of support for the final decisions. I n-
cluding these cases in the analysis would r e-
quire a model of agenda formation.
A second extension would require assuming
that the preferences of agents for different
issues are more complex than they are in the 
model discussed here. On the one hand, we 
could distinguish among different types of
issues according to their importance for the
partners. In our model, all partners get one unit 
of utility when their preferred proposal
(change or no change) is adopted, and zero 
otherwise. It is conceivable that each partner 
finds some issues more important than others, 
and also that different partners disagree on 
what is really crucial. This opens the door for 
several rules (instead of one): it might be that 
larger majorities are preferred by all agents for 
issues that they all agree are more important,
with smaller majorities required for lesser
issues. New possibilities for vote trading
would arise in case of disagreement, with part-
ners giving in on those issues that they deem 
less important, in exchange for votes when 
they really care. One possible way to avoid 
such strategic interchanges of votes is by si m-
ply letting individuals trade votes among
themselves, over different periods: give each 
agent a vote per decision, but let her store the 
vote if it is unimportant and use several votes 
on issues that she really cares about. This is 
the idea of storable votes, recently proposed 
by Cassella (2001). 
A third extension could be including comple-
mentary decisions in the model. In a dynamic 
context, winning on some votes may be irrele-
vant unless victory also comes in others. If a 
large project requires financing for five years 
in a row, getting funds for three years and not 
for the other two is by no means equivalent to 
having success in three-fifths of the cases! The 
need to have combinations of bills passed,
rather than single ones, may introduce impor-
tant qualifications in our analysis of the dy-
namic consequences of special majority rules. 
A last extension that is very useful for transna-
tional projects consists on having partners with 
different numbers of votes. We have carried 
out all the analysis under the assumption that 
each partner has one vote. This assumption is 
justified in many cases where partners have
the same status, or put the same resources at 
stake. But in infrastructure projects financed 
and developed by the private sector, the num-
bers of votes depend upon equity participation.
In most country partnerships, larger countries 
get a larger share of the vote, but that share is 
substantially smaller than what would corre-
spond to them by population size. At any rate, 
different weights will definitely alter some of 17
the results we expressed above, but not their 
spirit.
We have mentioned these possible extensions
in order to point at potential complications in 
the analysis of voting rules. But the basic mes-
sage does not need them. What is important is 
to realize that decisions rules, once adopted, 
influence the course of action taken by part-
nerships, and should therefore be the object of 
careful debate and negotiation.18
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This appendix provides an example of the strategic behavior that arises when even one vote is sufficient
for new entries in a partnership. The example is taken from Barberà, Maschler and Shalev (2001).
Consider a society already made up of a set of members (the founders), facing the possibility of incorpo-
rating new members during a number of periods. In our example there is only one founder, a, and twelve 
candidates
•  b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, d, and e
Candidates may be admitted at any one of 4 periods, after a vote. In our example, each member of society 
(that is, the founder, plus whatever candidate has been admitted in previous periods, can vote for as many 
candidates as desired. All candidates that receive one or more votes are admitted, and can vote for the 
remaining periods. Once elected, no one can be expelled. The founder and the candidates as well, get 
utility for the time that they belong to the society. Their utility is the sum of utilities received from  shar-
ing the society with other members, calculated as follows. If an agent likes another, he gets one unit of 
utility per period they share as members. If an agent dislikes another, he gets  -1-e units of utility per pe-
riod (with e a small number, enough to make the union of a friend and an enemy be less desirable than 
having none). The list of friends and enemies of these different agents is the following:
•  a likes b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, and no one else.
•  bi likes ci, and no one else, for i=1,…,5
•  ci, like d, and no one else, for i=1,…,5
•  d likes e, and no one else
•  e likes nobody
Notice that, in this example and in other similar situations, voting for a friend is not always optimal, if 
this friend might eventually vote for other undesirable candidates. Hence, the election of friends may be 
postponed up to the last period, when their future votes are no longer a possible threat, or at least delayed 
for a few periods. Also notice that no agent has an incentive to vote for someone else with the purpose of 
a future alliance to elect others, since each voter has enough power to elect any candidate, just with one 
vote. Hence, one may suspect that there are no circumstances where voting for an enemy makes sense. 
Yet, our example shows that such cases may arise, as the result of the possible deterrent effect that this 
enemy may have on the voting behavior of other members of society.
To see that, we argue that the following strategy profile is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the game 
induced by the above voting rules. An equilibrium profile:
•  If elected at any period, e votes for no one
•  If elected at any period, d votes for e in the following period
•  If elected at the period before last, any ci votes for his friend d in the last. If elected before, he will 
vote for d immediately provided e is already in the club. Otherwise, he will wait till the last period, 
and then vote for d.
•  If elected at the period before last, any bi will vote for his friend ci in the last period. If elected with 
two periods ahead, he will immediately vote for ci only if d is already in the society. Otherwise, he 
will wait to vote for ci in the last period.
•  If already a member of society with three periods ahead, bi will vote for ci if d is already in, or else if 
e is not in. Otherwise, he will postpone his vote for ci.20
•  The founder votes for all the b's and for e in the first period. 
This is an equilibrium, and when played, it results in agents of type b postponing their support for the c's
until the last round of vote. The founder will find it advantageous to include his e nemy e because the 
presence of this agent prevents the b's from voting early in favor of the c's, whom the founder dislikes. 
Candidate e is the useful enemy, worth bringing in at an early stage. 